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Recent decisions by several state supreme courts finding that their
states' bans on same-sex marriage violates their respective state con-
stitutions have sparked a heated and growing debate across the coun-
try.1 It is fortuitous that, while I prepared this presentation, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court issued an advisory opinion to its state's
senate affirming part of what I say here. 2 This was followed by the
Mayor of San Francisco issuing marriage licenses, which have now
been disallowed by the California Supreme Court,3 and President
George W. Bush calling for a federal constitutional amendment to
protect marriage as a strictly heterosexual institution.
4
The issue of whether to allow same-sex marriage has many different
facets and has become a very important cultural debate throughout
the Western World. 5 In the United States, two polarized views and a
number of compromise approaches have emerged from this debate.
6
* Adjunct Professor of Law. Illinois Institute of Technology's Chicago-Kent College of Law:
Adjunct Professor of Philosophy, Loyola University Chicago and Oakton Community College.
This Article is based on a presentation given at the Symposium: Privacy and Identity: Construct-
ing, Maintaining, and Protecting Personhood, at DePaul University College of Law on March 13.
2004. The author gives many thanks to Mark Strasser of Capital University and Christopher
Lane of Northwestern University for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. See generally Andrew Jacobs. Georgia Voters to Decide Gay Marriage Issue in the Fall, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2004, at A14: Dean E. Murphy, Bid to Stop San Francisco from Letting Gays
Marry, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 14, 2004, at AI0: Tatsha Robertson. Civil Disobedience Adds to Battle
over Same-Sex Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 15, 2004, at Al.
2. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate. 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004).
3. Carolyn Marshall. Dozens of Gay Couples Marry in San Francisco Ceremonies. N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 13, 2004. at A24. Without yet deciding whether its state constitution bars the legislature
from prohibiting same-sex marriages, the California Supreme Court held void. as a misuse of
official authority, those marriage licenses issued to same-sex couples on orders of the mayor of
San Francisco. See Lockyer v. City and County of S.F.. 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004).
4. Elisabeth Bumiller, Same-Sex Marriage: The President, Bush Backs Ban in Constitution on
Gay Marriage. N.Y. TIMES. Feb. 25, 2004, at At.
5. Kathleen Harris. Tory's Anti-Gay Rant "Venomous", THE TORONTO SUN. May 9, 2003, at
12: Keith B. Richburg. Gay Marriage Becomes Routine for Dutch: Two Years After Enacting
Law, Up to 8% of Weddings Are Same-Sex Unions, WASH. POST, Sept. 23. 2003, at A20.
6. See The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Gay Marriage (PBS television broadcast, Nov. 18.
2003). The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer's official website, Online NewsHour. provides a tran-
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One view finds such bans necessary to defend marriage as a relation-
ship between one man and one woman from what is perceived to be a
pernicious and immoral attack from outside the institution.7 To this
group, even adoption of a federal constitutional amendment to pro-
hibit same-sex marriage is feasible.8 The opposing view sees what
some state courts have done as correcting yet another vestige of en-
trenched discrimination against a politically unpopular and relatively
powerless group in society.9 In between these poles are a number of
efforts, some well-meaning, to find compromise. 10 Some states, for
example Hawaii and California, offer some benefits but not as many
as Vermont's civil union legislation." That law was enacted after the
Vermont Supreme Court held that its state's ban violated the common
benefits provision of its state's constitution.' 2 What differentiates the
Vermont law from other domestic partner legislation is that, for the
first time, the full panoply of private, tangible, strictly states' rights
and benefits of marriage are now conveyed under the name "civil
union."' 3 Still, since civil unions are not recognizing matrimonial sta-
tus-because many Vermonters, like many in the country, do not wish
script of the program. See Gay Marriage, A NewsHour with Jim Lehrer Transcript (Nov. 18,
2003), at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july-dec3/gay- 1-18.html. See generally Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999): Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-
6562CJ, 1998 WL 88743 (Ak. Super. Feb. 27, 1998).
7. See The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer. supra note 6; Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 941.
8. The proposed constitutional amendment circulating in Congress reads: "Marriage in the
United States shall consist solely of the union of a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution,
nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require that marriage or the legal inci-
dents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of a man and a woman." H.R.J.
Res. 106, 108th Cong. (2004). At his State of the Union Address, President Bush came out in
favor of a federal constitutional amendment to protect marriage. See State of the Union; 'We
Must Pass Reforms That Solve the Financial Problems of Social Security', N.Y. TIMES. Feb. 3,
2005, at A22 (providing a transcript of the President's speech).
9. See Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004).
10. Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Weighing Deal on Gay Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2004, at
Al.
11. As part of the legislation authorizing the ballot initiative in Hawaii that allowed that
state's constitution to be amended to reserve marriage only for opposite-sex couples, the legisla-
ture enacted a domestic partnership law that allows nontraditional couples to register as "recip-
rocal beneficiaries" with survivorship rights, health benefits, property rights, and legal standing
to bring wrongful death and victims' rights claims. See HAW. REV. SrAT. §§ 572C-1-7 (1999).
See also David J. Garrow, Toward a More Perfect Union, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 9, 2004. at 52
(discussing changes to the laws affecting same-sex couples in Hawaii, Vermont, Massachusetts.
and California).
12. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2003) (providing in subsection (a) that "all the same bene-
fits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether they derive from statute, administrative
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to go beyond mere tolerance and still conceive marriage as a sacred,
heterosexual institution-I question how much of a real compromise
this is.' 4
I argue that civil unions are not a separate but equal substitute for
same-sex marriage for a variety of different, though related, reasons,
and that same-sex couples should not be lulled into believing other-
wise. First, civil unions do not carry the same social meaning as mar-
riage, nor are they intended to imbue such social meaning.
15 In fact,
marriage itself will undergo a change in its social meaning once same-
sex couples are admitted into it, which is what the President and some
others are worried about.1 6 Second, treating the two institutions as if
they were the same overlooks important ways that culture shapes self-
esteem and regulates the development of individual identities, and
along with that, impedes or promotes true human autonomy.
17 Fi-
nally, equality requires giving same-sex couples the same opportuni-
ties to marry as opposite-sex couples and not channeling them into a
less-regarded institutional status. 18 Here it is also worth noting that
affording same-sex couples the right to marry is likely to reconstruct
the institution of marriage so as to move it away from its historical
connection to gender roles and female subservience and towards
close-to-equal partnership.' 9 The arguments that I make are, in the
first instance, moral arguments along the lines that noted legal scholar
14. A notable exception is the Massachusetts Supreme Court's Opinion of the Justices to the
Senate. 802 N.E.2d 565 (2004). in which the Massachusetts Senate asked the court whether af-
fording Vermont-style civil unions without granting marriage would satisfy the equal 
protection
and due process standards of that state's constitution. In expressing the opinion 
that it would
not, the court made clear that the proposed bill would create 'a separate class of 
citizens by
status discrimination, and withhold from that class the institution of civil marriage, 
along with its
concomitant tangible and intangible protections, benefits. rights and responsibilities." 
Id. at 571.
15. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2000) (citing Legislative Findings #10, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.),
§ 1 (2000)). See also Jonathan Rauch, The Power of Two: The Road to Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, § 6, at 13.
16. Jonathan Rauch. The Way We Live Now: 3-7-04. The Road to Gay Marriage. N.Y. 
TIMES,
Mar. 7. 2004. § 4. at 12.
17. See JON ELSTER. Sour Grapes 109-40 (1983).
18. Professor Eskridge has noted a sedimentary development in the menu of institutional
forms that has developed both in Europe and the United States for recognizing different 
levels
of relationships, both opposite-sex and same-sex. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Comparative
Law and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate: A Step-By-Step Approach Toward State Recognition, 
31
McGEOROE L. REV. 641 (2000). Additionally, Alan Gewirth argues that a justified system of
human rights requires "that all persons have effective rights to equal opportunity for 
their ca-
pacity-fulfillment." ALAN GEWiRTH. SELF-FULFILLMENT 86 (1998).
19. David B. Cruz. Disestablishing Sex and Gender. 90 CALIF. L. REV. 997. 1080 (2002).
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Carlos Ball might recommend for gay politics.20 Only after that
threshold is met do the arguments turn into legal arguments.
The so-called "sacredness" of marriage view may have arisen in me-
dieval Europe with early ties to Jewish tradition and postdating early
Roman and Hellenistic property notions. 21 Still, its significance to to-
day's popular culture may be more connected to remembrances of
one's own family and media depictions of people dressed in tuxedos
and gowns, walking down a church aisle. 22 Contrast that with the way
the public generally thinks about divorce, portrayed with images of
courtrooms filled with angry parties "at each other's throats. '2 3 While
this view of marriage may be somewhat in flux, it is still the dominant
cultural image of the institution.24
More important for this analysis are the wide range of other
messages concerning family and intimacy that American culture has
attached to the institution.2 5 Pro-Gay, conservative (in the sense of
wanting to assimilate gays and lesbians into more traditional cultural
institutions rather than to reject those institutions outright), and pro-
same-sex marriage advocates like Andrew Sullivan and Gabriel
Rotello believe gay people who desire to inhabit a so-called "normal"
identity will find entry into marriage a means to achieving this.26 But
other more liberal pro-gay commentators such as Judith Butler and
Michael Warner worry about whether buying into institutions like
marriage will co-op a part of the sexual freedom movement that envi-
20. See generally CARLOS BALL, THE MORALITY OF GAY RIGHTS: AN EXPLORATION IN PO-
LITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2003).
21. See JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE 32-33 (1994); Otis R.
Damslet, Note, Same-Sex Marriage, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 555. 559-60 (1993). But see
John Finnis, The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Relations: Some Philosophical and
Historical Observations, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 97 (1997).
22. See Bruce Bawer, The Marrying Kind, N.Y. TIMES. Mar. 8, 1996, at A31 (arguing that the
sacredness of marriage stems not from a quality essential to marriage but from its opposition to
non-marriage and homosexual sodomy). See generally Steven K. Homer, Note, Against Mar-
riage, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505 (1993).
23. Bob Thompson, A Modern Divorce: A Family's Unique Arrangement for Putting the Chil-
dren First, NEWSDAY. Jan. 13, 2003, at B06 (noting that the image most Americans have of di-
vorce is a "sharp-edged collage of uncontrolled rage and pain").
24. Just consider the number of shows on television in which marriage ceremonies are de-
picted. For example. each spring, Good Morning America, an ABC news broadcast, televises an
elaborate marriage ceremony from Times Square in New York City. See, e.g.. Dionne Walker,
Firefighter Wed on Good Morning America, FIREHOUSE.CoM NEWS (June 25, 2001), at http://
server.firehouse.com/news/2001/6/25_FHwed.html.
25. See, e.g., Michael Massing, Bishop Lee's Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2004, § 6, at 34 (dis-
cussing the uproar within the Episcopal Church over the decision to confirm as bishop an openly
gay man, who is in a committed same-sex relationship): Gerald L. Zelizer, Gay Marriage: A
Compromise, N.Y. TIMES. Jan. 4, 2004, § 14. at 13.
26. See MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS
OF QUEER LIFE 110, 142 (1999).
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sions use of pornography, ownership of sex businesses, and sex
outside the home. 27 Change is not, however, one-dimensional. It is
not a matter of gays becoming more like straights, or straights becom-
ing more like gays, notwithstanding Queer Eye for the Straight Guy.
28
Both sides miss the point of what is currently happening in American
culture by failing to see the dual possibilities of change for both same-
sex couples themselves and society-at-large. The only comparable al-
ternative would be for states to get out of the marriage business alto-
gether and simply recognize intimate unions. But, while perhaps
desirable, that is unlikely to happen in today's political climate.
2 9 It
may happen indirectly, however, if marriage continues to lose its dis-
tinctive identity. 30 Still, whatever the future of marriage will be, it is
unlikely that unions for only one group and marriages for the other
will afford much satisfaction if the real interest is in receiving genuine
public recognition of the intimate relationships involved.
This Article was originally presented as a talk at the Luncheon for
the Symposium: Privacy and Identity: Constructing, Maintaining, and
Protecting Personhood, at the DePaul University College of Law on
March 13, 2004. Consequently, it is made up of a number of short but
specific arguments that have since been updated to encompass a rap-
idly changing political environment. Part II of this Article explains
why just affording the same rights to gays and lesbians under a differ-
ent institutional name other than marriage will not be enough to se-
cure the same status as marriage. Part III connects the social
recognition of marriage to one's own sense of self-fulfillment and self-
worth. It also argues that this connection is not idiosyncratic to the
individual but inherent in the social nature of the institution itself.
Part IV goes on to show that this connection implicates not only law,
but also culture and the kind of society in which we live. It also sug-
gests that a way to avoid diminishing individual self-fulfillment is to
make the institution of marriage available to all without encumbrance,
even though this may have the effect of altering our understanding of
the institution to some significant degree. Part V argues that respect
27. Id. at vii, 142.
28. Queer Eye for the Straight Guy (Bravo Television Broadcasts 2003). On this television
show, a group of five gay men set out each week to "transform a style-deficient and culture-
deprived straight man from drab to fab" with respect to "fashion, food & wine, interior design.
grooming and culture." Queer Eye for the Straight Guy, at http://www.bravotv.com/Queer-Eye
for the-StraightGuy/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
29. Cf Jack Layton, Why We Must Change the Voting System, TORONTO STAR. Aug. 29, 2003.
at A25.
30. David B. Cruz, "Just Don't Call It Marriage": The First Amendment and Marriage as an
Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 950 (2001).
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for autonomy and equality, which had been foundational in the previ-
ous section, requires us to oppose any attempt to amend the Constitu-
tion to ban same-sex marriage. Finally, this Article concludes with a
brief remark about the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of
Education .31
II. WHY JUST AFFORDING RIGHTS Is NOT ENOUGH TO Do RIGHT
In this Part, I begin to show why the private tangible rights of mar-
riage, which include rights to property transfers, inheritance, tax bene-
fits, and decisionmaking on both health issues and other important
legal matters, are not adequate to afford individuals the social dignity
that comes with the status of marriage. 32 The late American Civil Lib-
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. VT. STAr. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1204(e)(1)-(24) (2003), extends, under subsection (e), the same
legal rights as apply to marriage to the following nonexclusive list of legal areas:(1) laws relating to title, tenure, descent and distribution, intestate succession, waiver
of will. survivorship. or other incidents of the acquisition, ownership. or transfer,
inter vivos or at death, of real or personal property, including eligibility to hold
real and personal property as tenants by the entirety... ;(2) causes of action related to or dependent upon spousal status, including an action
for wrongful death, emotional distress, loss of consortium, dramshop, or other
torts or actions under contracts reciting, related to, or dependent upon spousal
status:
(3) probate law and procedure, including nonprobate transfer;
(4) adoption law and procedure:(5) group insurance for state employees . . . and continuing care contracts:
(6) spouse abuse programs ... ;(7) prohibitions against discrimination based upon marital status:(8) victim's compensation rights . ..
(9) workers' compensation benefits
(10) laws relating to emergency and nonemergency medical care and treatment, hospi-
tal visitation and notification, including the Patient's Bill of Rights . . . and the
Nursing Home Residents' Bill of Rights ..
(11) advance directives . ..
(12) family leave benefits . ..
(13) public assistance benefits under state law;(14) laws relating to taxes imposed by the state or a municipality;(15) laws relating to immunity from compelled testimony and the marital communica-
tion privilege:
(16) the homestead rights of a surviving spouse ... and homestead property tax allow-
ance ...
(17) laws relating to loans to veterans . ..
(18) the definition of family farmer . . .:(19) laws relating to the making, revoking and objecting to anatomical gifts by others
(20) state pay for military service . . .
(21) application for earlier voter absentee ballot ...(22) family landowner rights to fish and hunt . . .
(23) legal requirements for assignment of wages ... ; and
(24) affirmance of relationship ....
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erties Union (ACLU) gay rights attorney and activist Thomas Stod-
dard was fond to note that what is at stake is not marriage, but the
right to marry, as a way of obtaining these rights and with these rights
raising the dignity of same-sex couples to equate with society's views
of opposite-sex couples.33 But even though these rights may be neces-
sary for dignity, they are certainly not sufficient if all that is trans-
ferred is just a list of favored freedoms. As renowned twentieth
century philosopher John Rawls reminds us, the natural or social cir-
cumstances in which one finds oneself significantly affects any attempt
at achieving human self-fulfillment. 34 Consequently, where civil rights
derive from a social context, the social context is both generative and
constitutive of the fulfillment that comes from having those rights.
35
Further, in close cases of interpretation, the social context may ad-
vance one interpretation over another, especially where the matter
concerns legislative intent.
36
For opposite-sex couples, marriage includes the state's 37 official im-
primatur for the intimacy formed.38 It also separates marriage from
other, sometimes less permanent, human relationships such as family,
friends, and more distant acquaintances where the same level of inti-
macy would not be expected nor respected. 39 Notably, the general
culture's view about legal marriage provides no comparable institu-
tion for same-sex couples. But is this not exactly what same-sex un-
Id. (citations omitted).
33. Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, in LESBIAN AND
GAY MARRIAGE 13, 17 (Suzanne Sherman ed., 1992). But see Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is
Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE, supra, at 20, 20-21.
34. See JOHN RAWLS. A THEORY OF JUSTrICE 72, 74, 102, 312 (1971).
35. It is important to note that the communitarian thesis being adopted here is not in contra-
distinction to the autonomous-based individualism usually associated with rights theories. The
claim is not that individuals will have no status independent of their social setting, but rather that
what they seek will likely be based, at least in part, on what their social surroundings allow for
them. See MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 5 (1984). See also GEWIRTH, supra
note 18, at 197-99 (1998) (citing SANDEL. supra, at 199). Much is gained by way of explanatory
power in recognizing that certain ends provided by society may be more productive of human
happiness writ large than others, especially when they are equally distributed. See id. at 198.
That being the case. the communitarian thesis actually provides for discussion and debate over
the value of different institutional arrangements in achieving self-fulfillment. Id. at 199.
36. One of the ways to determine legislative intent and meaning of the terms of an otherwise
ambiguous statute is to look to the debates on the legislative floors and in the various commit-
tees. See MORRIS L. COHEN ET AL.. How To FIND THE LAW 174-75 (9th ed. 1989).
37. By the state's, I also mean society's.
38. Pam Belluck. Gays Respond: "I Do," "I Might" and "I Won't", N.Y. TIMES. Nov. 26, 2003.
at Al.
39. Almost every state and the federal government provides some form of spousal immunity
against being forced to testify against one's spouse in a court of law. See Joan L. Neisser. Les-
sons for the United States: A Greek Cypriot Model for Domestic Violence Law, 4 MICH. J. GEN-
DER & L. 171. 181 (1996).
2005]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
ions are meant to provide? 40 Commentator Jonathan Rauch does not
think so. In a new book, entitled Gay Marriage, he makes the point
that "[m]arriage-lite [like 'lite ice-cream'] is not a true substitute for
marriage, because it is not the same thing."' 4'
In my estimation, Rauch is correct because much of the social
meaning sought from a same-sex marriage is altered when the rights
of marriage are transferred to same-sex unions without the status.
The issue is not, however, a matter of finding the right definition for
the sake of clarifying some obscure institution with different social
meanings, as it may be between "civil marriage" and "sacred mar-
riage."' 42 Further, it is not a matter of defining a new institution to
reveal some deep-seated truth that has otherwise eluded us. 43 If any-
thing, the contrary is true: Civil marriage is well-known. 44 The real
issue is whether we should perpetuate between two groups of people a
normative distinction that at its core will always say to same-sex
couples, "you are not quite as good as your opposite-sex counterparts
because you cannot marry."
That being said, if society feels the same-sex couple's relationship is
inferior, or not quite as worthy as a seemingly equivalent opposite-sex
relationship, then the couple's self-worth will likely be diminished.45
To a certain extent, the partners may regret what they have achieved
or view it at most as the best that can be made of a bad situation, as
opposed to the best that can be obtained from a potentially good
40. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2000) (citing Legislative Findings #11, No. 91 (Adj. Sess.),
§ 1 (2000)).
41. JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE 46 (2004).
42. The use of definitions is most helpful where the dispute is "merely verbal" and not "obvi-
ously genuine." See IRVING COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 120-21 (10th ed.
1998). When the dispute is really genuine in the sense of being related to attitudes and beliefs,
definitions are of little help. See id. at 120-24 (detailing types of disputes).
43. See id. at 131-32 (regarding theoretical definitions).
44. All fifty states and most foreign countries that are not theocracies provide for civil mar-
riage. See Joseph W. Hovermill, A Conflict of Laws and Morals: The Choice of Law Implications
of Hawaii's Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 53 MD. L. REV. 450, 486 (1994).
45. Professor John Finnis, who follows a certain type of natural law position has argued that
not only is same-sex love "sterile and disposes the participants to an abdication of responsibility
for the future of humankind," and that it fails to "actualize the mutual devotion that some homo-
sexual persons hope to manifest and experience by it," but also that it
is deeply hostile to the self-understanding of those members of the community who are
willing to commit themselves to real marriage [even one that happens to be sterile] in
the understanding that its sexual joys are not mere instruments or accompaniments to,
or mere compensation for, the accomplishments of marriage's responsibilities, but
rather are the actualizing and experiencing of the intelligent commitment to share in
those responsibilities.
John Finnis, Disintegrity, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 15, 1993, at 12, 12.
[Vol. 54:783
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one.4 6 This results because the senses of "bad" and "good" in this
social context are socially constructed for the couple by the dominant
culture's determination through its marriage discourse of what is ac-
ceptable. 47 That discourse confronts the individual through the inter-
play of two related connections. The first is the public-institutional
connection; the second is the aspiration-capacity connection. The first
is mostly public, while the second is mostly private. It is my conten-
tion that the public-institutional connection brings about the aspira-
tion-capacity connection when the dominant culture validates the
objects of private self-fulfillment. This raises the question: Is it really
fair, however, to assign to same-sex couples, compared to opposite-sex
couples, the same rights and benefits of marriage without saying the
relationship really is the same? This requires close examination of the
underlying relationship that marriage extols.
1II. THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MARRIAGE AS A BASIS
FOR INDIVIDUAL SELF-FULFILLMENT
Here, I begin by paraphrasing what the neo-Kantian philosopher
Alan Gewirth says about the marriage institution generally. Marriage,
when conceived as a reflection of the partners' mutual love, serves to
enhance each partner's general ability to maximize his or her individ-
ual freedom and well-being.4 It does this by contributing to their in-
dividual human capacity-fulfillment in making each partner the best
that he or she can be at developing and maintaining human relation-
ships. 49 The word "best" here signifies the importance of the marital
relationship to each partner's human capacity fulfillment in which
"the self is viewed as a more or less ordered set of powers, abilities, or
potentialities. '50 It also provides the institutional space in which the
cultivation of their mutual love is publicly recognized as part and par-
cel of their individual self-worth and dignity. 51 When each partner
becomes the locus and source of satisfaction for the other, the individ-
ual's dignity is enhanced, affirmed by the public's recognition that
46. Although expressing some concerns. Richard Posner notes that allowing same-sex mar-
riage would likely raise the self-esteem of gay men and lesbians. RICHARD A. POSNER. SEX AND
REASON 311, 313 (1992).
47. The problem is analogous to the dominant culture's view that a two-parent household is a
better setting in which to raise children. See Amy L. Wax, The Two-Parent Family in the Liberal
State: The Case for Selective Subsidies. I MICH. J. RACE & L. 491. 542 (1996). Contra Robert P.
George & Christopher Wolfe, "Public Reason" and Reasons for Action by a Public Authority:
An Exchange of Views, 42 AM. J. JURIs. 31, 49 n.4 (1997).
48. GEWIRTH, supra note 18, at 143.
49. Id. at 144.
50. See id. at 14.
51. See id.
2005]
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their aspirations are satisfied. The dignity afforded by the marital re-
lationship thus supervenes in a very public way on each partner's vol-
untary and purposeful choice to be, to some important extent, an end
for the other.5 2
In this sense, the marriage relationship becomes more than just the
rights and benefits that create the possibility of human satisfaction, for
the relationship itself is now seen as an end worthy of pursuit.53 The
relationship opens a door to capacities one might otherwise never
seek to develop. 54 It also creates a sense of permanency by embody-
ing a socially recognized set of commitments and a public attestation
to the significance of these commitments. 55 The partners affirm their
mutual commitment to benefit each other, and the public, in turn, sees
that act as a positive good that the couple has achieved and which was
not entered into lightly. 56 That is the intangible social meaning of
marriage generally, at least when viewed in the opposite-sex context. 57
It is what American culture instills in young people as a reason to
marry. 58 And no doubt, this adds background to Yale University Law
Professor William Eskridge's comment that "the value of a committed
partner is incalculable. ' '59 That publicly recognized value is also what
is diminished when the rights and benefits of marriage are transferred
without affording the same status. 60
52. The idea of supervenience is this: "Properties of type A are supervenient on properties of
type B if and only if two objects cannot differ with respect to their A-properties without also
differing with respect to their B-properties." THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 778
(Robert Audi ed., 2d ed. 1995).
53. Thomas Stoddard has noted that "[mlarriage is much more than a relationship sanctioned
by law. It is the centerpiece of our entire social structure, the core of the traditional notion of
'family."' Stoddard, supra note 33, at 17.
54. Alan Gewirth notes that the preferential status afforded the devotions of a married couple
is justified by the ability of marriage to enhance the partners' freedom and well-being and thus
by its ability to contribute to their capacity for fulfillment. GEWIRTH. supra note 18. at 143.
55. Even those opposed to same-sex marriage admit that an important aspect of the social
meaning of marriage, notwithstanding the high divorce rate, is that marriage is assumed to be a
permanent state in which one achieves human flourishing through "self-realization and self-giv-
ing ...over an extended period of time." See Should the Government Recognize Same-Sex
Marriage?, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 35 (2000).
56. See id. (arguing that the marriage relationship is "mutually supportive").
57. Here I simply mean that the way we feel about ourselves is often a product of the way
others express their feelings about us.
58. See Carlos A. Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 443, 498
(2000).
59. WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO
CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 74 (1996) (discussing the value of committed partnerships when one
partner has AIDS).
60. Here, the point is that the social meaning is part of the intension of the term "marriage."
not part of its extension. The intension of a term, sometimes called its connotation, refers to the
characteristics or attributes the members of the term's extension share, whereas the extension is
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The social meaning of marriage cannot be separated from the rights
of marriage any more than the social meanings of "morning star" and
"evening star" or "equilateral triangle" and "equiangular triangle"
can be separated from what these terms denote.6' Still, it is also true
that using the phrase "morning star" in place of "evening star" and
"equilateral triangle" in place of "equiangular triangle" connotes very
different ideas. What the term "marriage" adds to the couple's aspira-
tions is normative legitimacy, which because it is a social institution,
significantly affects the way the couple itself views the commitment.
62
I think political commentator and author Michael Warner is wrong
to think that seeking marital legitimacy might stifle other forms of sex-
ual expression, especially by single people. 63 Marriage is neither a
cause nor a limitation on other forms of sexual expression, although
these other forms might give rise to a decision to marry. This is be-
cause these forms of expression are not more legitimate absent mar-
riage. Moreover, as civil marriage moves further away from
procreation, which has never been a requirement for marriage,64 it
increases the possibility of legitimate experimentation to see if mar-
riage, with all its institutional trappings, is right for the individuals in-
volved. 65 I also disagree with social commentator and author Andrew
Sullivan because I am unpersuaded that marriage will not itself
change or that it will constrain lesbians and gay men into following a
certain style of relationship any more than the free exercise of religion
constrains different people into adopting a certain style of religious
faith. 66 The future of marriage may be uncertain, but given the real
harm to those same-sex couples being denied it today, that uncertainty
provides insufficient reason not to recognize same-sex marriage.
Still, those willing to compromise to resolve the issue quickly might
argue that the same aspirations that may exist in a marriage could be
the list of those members either by name or group. See Copi & COHEN, supra note 42, at 137.
For example, the intension of "human being" might be rational animal. Its extension includes all
the humans who ever lived either by name or group, such as Americans. Asians. Europeans, and
Africans.
61. See IRVING Coi'i & CARL COHEN. INTROi)UCTION -io LOGIC 114-17 (11th ed. 2002) (dis-
cussing definitions of terms by intension and extension).
62. Zelizer. supra note 25.
63. See, e.g.. Michael Warner, Be yond Gay Marriage, in LEFir LEC;AtI'sM/LFVi CRiIioUE 259.
276-78 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) (claiming that same-sex marriage will advance
efforts to make certain gay relationships "normative" while stigmatizing others).
64. See Kathryn Dean Kendell. Principles and Prejudice: Lesbian and Gay Civil Marriage and
the Realization of Equality. 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 81, 88-89 (1996).
65. See generally Eskridge. supra note 18.
66. See Ettelbrick, supra note 33. at 21. See also Stoddard. supra note 33, at 13-14 (stating
that marriage will limit gay people's potential and undermine gay liberation).
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brought to fulfillment in a Vermont union-like relationship. If the as-
pirations are only those of the individuals involved, why should it mat-
ter what the institution is called, especially if the state attaches legal
consequences to the obligations of each partner to the other? Under
these circumstances, would separate really be equal? It seems that to
answer "yes" to this question, when taken as anything more than ac-
quiescence to an already bad situation, is to ignore the role of culture
in human capacity fulfillment. It is to believe that the choice of name
is just a means to clarify a difference and not to say that the two things
really are different, or even more, that the one is better than the
other.67 Fear of not specifying enough of a difference between tradi-
tional marriage and tolerance of other forms of same-sex relationships
is what causes some on the extreme right to push for a marriage
amendment. 68 It is also why the Vatican has put out a call for
Catholics worldwide to resist attempts to create any semblance of
marriage by way of either civil unions or domestic partnerships.69
But that means that culture in all its various respects (religion, legal
recognition, and even institutional name) has a causal or influential
role to play in this important debate. In a liberal society with a hu-
manistic culture, wide differences in aesthetic appreciation may be as-
signed to the creations of various individuals and groups in the sense
that differences in styles and approach will be socially accepted, al-
though standards of excellence will exist within each creative mode.
The latter reflects a constant normative element. That element has
been described by Victorian Poet Matthew Arnold as "a pursuit of our
total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matters which
most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the
world." 70
Here, the normative reference to "best" also suggests a causal con-
nection to human capacity fulfillment-where one comes to knowl-
edge of oneself by being encouraged to know and eventually to
67. Thomas Stoddard has noted, "Lesbians and gay men are now denied entry to this 'noble'
and 'sacred' institution. The implicit message is this: two men or two women are incapable of
achieving such an exalted domestic state. Gay relationships are somehow less significant, less
valuable." Stoddard, supra note 33, at 18.
68. In his 2004 State of the Union Address to Congress, President George W. Bush said: "If
judges insist on forcing their arbitrary will upon the people, the only alternative left to the peo-
ple would be the constitutional process." State of the Union: President's State of the Union Mes-
sage to Congress and the Nation, N.Y. TIMES. Jan. 21, 2004, at A19 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
69. CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING PRO-
POSALS TO GIVE LEGAL RECOGNITION TO UNIONS BETWEEN HOMOSEXUAL PERSONS (July 31,
2003). available at http://www.vatican.va/roman-curia/congregations/cfaith/doc doc index.htm.
70. MATTHEW ARNOLD, CULTURE AND ANARCHY 6 (J. Dover Wilson ed., 1969) (1869).
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become the best that the world and one's abilities will allow. In such a
context, any disparagement of an aspiration, even if only by assigning
it to a lesser category of importance, will harm self-worth. In those
who hold the aspiration, the assignment creates an alienation from
what they are doing, which becomes an alienation from themselves.
71
This seems to be what lies behind the teaching of Brown v. Board of
Education,7 2 that even if we could make the schools technically equal,
the mere fact that we assign blacks to "black schools" and whites to
"white schools" creates in black children, as the minority group that
suffers limited access to institutions, a sense of inferiority that they
will carry throughout their lives. 73
This feeling of inferiority develops because self-worth is not innate,
although it may have a genetic antecedent.7 4 It arises out of one's
own efforts with encouragement from others to develop the requisite
capacities to achieve one's aspirations and make them one's own.
75
Consequently, where the culture stigmatizes an aspiration, it impedes
developing the capacities that might bring about self-worth. The
likely impact may be to cause one to disavow, or at least lessen, one's
effort to develop those capacities. 76
To use a clich6, one is made to feel like a "second-class citizen" in a
society that elevates the importance of equality to a high value. The
value of equality-or, in this case, the departure from it-suggests
that what one is aspiring to, is really not at all of equal importance as
to what others aspire. Where this result occurs, it can fragment indi-
vidual identity by evoking within the psyche a conflict between one's
self-respect and self-esteem.77
Self-respect, as here understood, is a moral virtue in which one val-
ues living a moral life.78 "Self-esteem, on the other hand, is a pruden-
tial virtue" conditioned by how effective one is in obtaining one's
desired goals and aspirations. 79 Both virtues relate to a person's dig-
nity by enabling one to make the best of oneself. Self-esteem serves
71. See GEWIRTH, supra note 18, at 118-19 (discussing "alienation").
72. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
73. See id. at 494.
74. Christina Hardyment. In Love with Themselves. TIMES (London). Nov. 17. 2001, Life. at
17.
75. See GEWiRTH. supra note 18, at 39.
76. See generally SAMUEL J. WARNER, SELF-REALIZATION AND SELF-DEFEAT (1966) (treating
the issue from a Freudian point of view).
77. See Carl F. Stychin. Identities. Sexualities and the Postmodern Subject: An Analysis of Ar-
tistic Funding by the National Endowment of the Arts. 12 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 79, 117
(1994) (discussing the fragmenting of gay identities through "performative multiplicitous roles").
78. GEWiRTH, supra note 18. at 94-95.
79. Id. at 95.
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this role contingently by supporting one's sense of self-worth when the
objects one seeks to obtain do not violate anyone's basic rights and
reflect the best that one can become in the context of a given activ-
ity.8 Self-respect does this necessarily when one's treatment of one's
partner is validated by a normative system that sets out universal stan-
dards for how intimate couples should act. 81 Therefore, when self-
respect is used to attack self-esteem, like when one says to a same-sex
couple, "you have a nice friendship but you cannot really claim to be
able to fulfill the obligations that attach to a marital spouse," an inter-
nal psychological struggle within the psyche of the person attacked is
created. That struggle can lead to a sense of fragmentation with the
life one actually has, and where it might be going.82
Now, of course, there will be those who believe that such lessening
of effort is a good thing because the sexual activities of same-sex
couples are immoral and the desires for them disordered. 83 But that
presumes that one can judge in a wide variety of situations what is
good for others, even where no obvious dysfunction or overt harm is
present.8 4 That situation is very tenuous in a society that affirms the
dual values of liberty and equality, as the Supreme Court's recent de-
cision in Lawrence v. Texas was clear to point out.8 5 Still, I should at
least respond to this claim because a significant number of people in
our society will feel that same-sex sexual relations are immoral. This
appears most obviously, although not without some question, from the
fact that voters in ten out of eleven so-called "red states" (states
where the majority voted for Bush over Kerry in the 2004 presidential
80. Id. at 96.
81. Id. at 95-96.
82. Jon Elster has noted that in such circumstances "people tend to adjust their aspirations to
their possibilities." ELSTER, supra note 17, at 109.
83. See Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Letter to Bishops on the Pastoral Care of
Homosexual Persons §§ 3. 12 (Oct. 1, 1985), reprinted in 16 ORIGINs 377-82.
84. The Catholic Church claims infallibility on some moral and religious teachings, although it
has never claimed any of the aforementioned as being infallible truths. See Clifford Longley, Sex
Is Not a Safe Subject for the Pope, But He Is Due to Pronounce Again, TIMES (London), Sept. 21,
1991. at 12.
85. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558. 577-78 (2003). The Lawrence majority quoted Jus-
tice Stevens's dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick:
"Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact that the gov-
erning majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is
not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice .... Second, individ-
ual decisions by married persons. concerning the intimacies of their physical relation-
ship. even when not intended to produce offspring. are a form of 'liberty' protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection ex-
tends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons."
Id. (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186. 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes
and citations omitted)).
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election) approved by wide margins amendments to their state consti-
tutions banning same-sex marriage . 6
IV. MARRIAGE IMPLICATES THE KIND OF SOCIETY
WE WANT TO SUSTAIN
We would be well served by a broad consensus concerning what
constitutes a basic human right. It is unfortunate that no such consen-
sus exists. 87 Still, it is probably fair to say that most reflective people,
at least in Western societies, agree that any system of human rights
should afford protections and support for those freedoms of action
and characteristics of well-being that not only fail to harm others, but
also advance human flourishing through increased opportunities for
self-realization and actualization of individual potentialities. 88 That
being the case, one can appeal to a broad principle of equality to off-
set some of the more negative aspects of this debate. This resolution,
I suggest, protects autonomy to the greatest extent possible and,
hence, the freedom of all those for whom marriage is an important
social institution. Not to do so is to beg the question of our own
infallibility.
But if securing opportunities for self-fulfillment is the solution, it
must not be overinclusive. Certain kinds of religious freedom, even
when exhibited by large, highly organized groups, like the Roman
Catholic Church, will still be assured. 89 No church will have to recog-
nize same-sex marriage any more than the Catholic Church has had to
recognize divorce and remarriage. 90 But in recognizing this principle
86. See Sarah Kershaw. Constitutional Bans on Same-Sex Marriage Gain Widespread Support
in 10 States. N.Y. TIMES. Nov. 3. 2004. at P9. But see Pam Belluck. Maybe Same-Sex Marriage
Didn't Make the Difference. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7. 2004, § 4. at 5.
87. I do, however, offer some arguments for one in the context of gays and public education in
a previous article. See generally Vincent J. Samar, Autonomy, Gay Rights and Human Self-
Fulfillment: An Argument for Modified Liberalism in Public Education. 10 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 137 (2004).
88. A good example of this is the United Nation's adoption in 1948 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, which specifies a variety of political rights that all people hold: life. lib-
erty. privacy, freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of religion, and freedom to
participate in government. G.A. Res. 217. U.N. GAOR. 3d Sess.. at 71-77, U.N. Doc. A/Res
217A (1948). The Declaration also specifies a number of social and political rights such as the
right to social security, to rest and leisure, to an adequate education, and to participate in the
cultural life of the community. Id. All people are said to hold these rights regardless of race.
color, sex, language. religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property. birth,
or other status. Id. Arguably. sexual orientation, though not specifically mentioned in the Dec-
laration. could be subsumed under the phrase "other status." especially if sexual orientation is
thought to evoke a status and not just a set of activities.
89. The First Amendment continues to prohibit the state from establishing religion and guar-
antees the free exercise thereof. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
90. See, e.g., Hames v. Hames. 316 A.2d 379, 386 (Conn. 1972).
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of religious freedom, especially in the context of large-scale organiza-
tions, it becomes all the more incumbent on schools and public offi-
cials, as a matter of defending equal well-being, to be cognizant of the
negative psychological consequences that might follow when a sizable
segment of the population, especially its younger members, confronts
what these institutions teach. The way the culture should show sensi-
tivity for these consequences is by first guaranteeing, on the legal side,
complete equal access to civil marriage as a kind of check to see if the
differences between same-sex and opposite-sex couples should matter
at all. Next, society should, through its media and other educational
institutions, encourage public debates about, and a high level of re-
spect for, ending the psychological and sometimes physical harms
caused to various groups by social institutions operating in the name
of culture and religion. In this way, the positive aspects of same-sex
marriage could be systematically presented to offset negative
stereotypes.
Such legal protections, however, will not fully guarantee individual
equality for same-sex couples. These couples would still be affected
by the views of other important people in one's life-such as family,
friends, and clergy-who may not support the couple's mutual aspira-
tions.91 Still, at least one important ingredient toward changing those
negative views and producing feelings of self-worth would be accom-
plished; legalizing something has the positive influential affect on soci-
ety that such behavior cannot be all that bad.92 Further, it uses one
normative system to dialogue with another. This is especially true
where the legal protection is not qualified by limiting language, as it is,
for example, when the Surgeon General places a health warning on
every pack of cigarettes sold in the United States.93
The ethical and legal principle that I support is to affirm individual
value choices where dysfunction or overt physical or mental harm can-
not be directly shown, except by theories whose validations are gener-
ally suspect. 94 The issue here is not comparable to bans on polygamy
that can add to misogyny or incest that-at least for those who want
91. GEWIRrH, supra note 18, at 33.
92. For a discussion of the potential effects, both positive and negative, of legalizing gay mar-
riage. see Brad K. Gushiken. The Fine Line Between Love and the Law: Hawai'i's Attempt to
Resolve the Same-Sex Marriage Issue, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 149. 149-50 (2000).
93. See generally Keri L. Keller, Note. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly: The Supreme Court
Sends First Amendment Guarantees up in Smoke by Applying the Commercial Speech Doctrine to
Content-Based Regulations. 36 AKRON L. REV. 133 (2002).
94. Here I am following an idea that arises out of John Stuart Mill's "harm principle." See
JOHN STUART MILL. ON LIBERTY 68 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed.. 1974) (1859).
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natural children-can harm the genetic pool.9 5 Such a view of the
situation gives meaning to John Stuart Mill's harm principle: "[T]hat
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collec-
tively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is
self-protection .... His own good, either physical or moral, is not a
sufficient warrant. ' 96 But it does so in a way that does not leave the
individual without any opportunities for reflection, even with regard
to self-harm.
I do not wish to be misunderstood-I am not saying that one could
never discover, without help, the biases that may lie behind social val-
uations or provide a deeper critique of their legitimacy. If that were
the case, social values would never be called into question and my
current efforts would not make sense.97 Still, when issues like mar-
riage are at stake, it simply is not reasonable to expect that everyone
will be able to see past the cultural baggage to validate for themselves
what society refuses to value.98 Were this otherwise, society would
have little reason to be concerned about the influence of a subculture
of drugs and alcohol on the population generally, and especially on
the younger population. But there is more to this position than
merely seeing state recognition of same-sex marriage as an offset to
those who believe same-sex sexual behavior is immoral.
The picture that I have painted should suggest that the evaluation
of any important human engagement is never reducible to just the
private relationships the engagement denotes. It is therefore impor-
tant to recognize that opening the door to same-sex marriage will have
the greatest potential impact on the future of marriage as we know it.
The social conservative or fundamentalist has every reason to fear this
result. Why? If two men, who have been socialized as men, or two
women, who have been socialized as women, enter into the matrimo-
nial state, the cultural baggage of who they are will likely force into
marriage a level of equal respect seldom found in the past. 99 It will
have implications beyond any claim of marital rights affecting the
95. For an interesting discussion of these issues, see MARK STRASSER, THE CHALLENGE OF
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FEDERALIST PRINCIPLES AN1D CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS 10-15
(1999).
96. MILL, supra note 94, at 68.
97. But it takes a lot to create a Socrates. and laws are made for the rule. not the exception.
As John Austin notes, laws issue commands not to one person but to society generally. See JOHN
AUSTIN. THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 120-22 (2d ed. 1970).
98. ESKRIDGE. supra note 59, at 186-87 (suggesting that a double standard based on identity
implicates loss of jobs when violated, or proneness to alcoholism or suicide when it is not).
99. Virginia Rutter & Pepper Schwartz, Same-Sex Couples: Courtship, Commitment, Context.
in THE DIVERSITY IN HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS 197. 209 (Ann Elizabeth Auhagen & Maria von
Salisch eds., 1996). cited in Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private
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fabric of gender roles and identifications more than may be mani-
fested even by the social and economic realities of modern day life.
This so-called "subversive" impact of changing the meaning of mar-
riage will forever alter, as scholar and activist Tom Stoddard and dis-
tinguished law professor Cass Sunstein have noted, this most basic
organizing institution of our society away from paternalism or sepa-
rate sex roles for men and women and towards equality, thus becom-
ing a standard for other institutions to imitate. 110 In this way, the
position suggested here has the potential to become society's domi-
nant moral view.
In larger relief, when adapted to the case law, my arguments seem
consistent with the views of legal scholar Andrew Koppelman's inter-
pretation of the civil rights area since Brown."" Take, for example,
the U.S. Supreme Court's pro-marriage decision in Loving v. Vir-
ginia.10 2 In that case, the Court noted that statutory devices, like Vir-
ginia's miscegenation statute, were not benign-even if they could be
applied in the same way to blacks and whites-because they were de-
signed to maintain the supremacy of one race of people over an-
other.'0 3 This made them contrary to the ideals of equal protection
and an evil that society had a duty to stamp out. 14 Similarly, in Pal-
more v. Sidoti,10 5 the Court held that the race of a new spouse could
not be used to remove a child from the custody of its natural parent:11 6
"The Constitution cannot control such prejudices, but neither can it
Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. RE,. 79. 107 n.154 (2001). Professors Rutter and Schwartz
assert:
Both gay and lesbian partners will engage in the provider role, but they each prefer a
coprovider situation. Gay men. like other men, do not expect that a provider will take
care of them. When one gay partner is the provider, the partner who is being provided
for tends to be more dissatisfied with the situation. In contrast, lesbians do not expect
to support another person financially, except temporarily. Lesbians are not socialized.
as many men are, to take pleasure in a paternalistic provider role. A lesbian who finds
herself in the role of provider is likely to be the more dissatisfied partner.
Id.
100. See id. at 60-62. See also Cass R. Sunstein. Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 INi3.
L.J. 1. 16. 20-22 (1994).
101. Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage and Public Policy: The Miscegenation Prece-
dents. 16 QIJINNIPAc L. REV. 105, 116 (1996) (noting that the law of southern states was very
fact-dependent before Loving, always invalidating interracial marriages contracted outside the
state to evade a miscegenation law, sometimes dividing on interracial marriages contracted
outside the state before the couples moved into the state, and generally recognizing such mar-
riages of out-of-state couples when relevant to litigation in the state).
102. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
11)3. Id. at 11.
104. See id.
105. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
106. See generally id.
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tolerate them."' 1 7 When one adds into the mix the recent decisions of
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health from Massachusetts, hold-
ing that the Massachusetts ban on same-sex marriage violates its
state's Constitution,' 8 and Baker v. State of Vermont, holding simi-
larly with respect to the Common Benefits clause of the Vermont
Constitution, 109 one finds both courts expressing strong positive feel-
ings about the significance of the values that marriage implicates, even
with changes in the way it may evolve. This was particularly well said
in Goodridge where the court noted, "Civil marriage is at once a
deeply personal commitment to another human being and a highly
public celebration of the ideals of mutuality, companionship, intimacy,
fidelity, and family.""1I 0 Quoting the now famous U.S. Supreme Court
privacy case, Griswold v. Connecticut,' the Massachusetts Supreme
Court reminded us that
"[marriage] is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes:
a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not com-
mercial or social projects." Because it fulfils yearnings for security,
safe haven, and connection that express our common humanity, civil
marriage is an esteemed institution, and the decision whether and
whom to marry is among life's momentous acts of self-definition." 1
2
V. SAYING No TO THE MARRIAGE AMENDMENT AS
A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
In light of what I have written about equality, human rights, and the
significance of marriage to these concerns, I now cannot ignore the
President's proposed constitutional amendment, which I believe will
ultimately fail to be ratified, especially given a USA Today poll show-
ing seventy-seven percent of Americans surveyed were against its pas-
sage."13 Still, even if President Bush succeeds in passing a federal
constitutional amendment that effectively bans same-sex marriage, a
107. Id. at 433.
108. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
109. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
110. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954.
111. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
112. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954-55 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479. 486
(1965)).
13. The statistical information suggested here is based on an ABC News/Washington Post
Poll that was conducted in January 2004. The issue of the actual number of Americans that
would support a constitutional amendment is probably in flux. See Opinion Polls Mixed. DE
TROIT NEWS. Feb. 25, 2004. available at http://www.detnews.com/2004/politics/0402/27/a06-74178.
him. Notably. a Christian Science Monitor/TIPP poll shows that while only sixteen percent of
voters over the age of sixty-five support gay marriage, forty-one percent of voters between the
ages of eighteen and twenty-four do. See Noel C. Paul & Sara B. Miller. Politicians Hit a Hot
Button, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR. Mar. 11, 2004, at 1 2. It will be interesting to see if these
2005]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:783
number of changes will have already occurred in the country prior to
its coming into effect. Pursuant to the order of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, same-sex marriage has been legal in that state since
the spring of 2004.114 The California Supreme Court and the courts of
a few other states will soon decide whether, under their state constitu-
tions, same-sex marriage bans violate equal protection.'1 5 Canada's
Supreme Court has already given the go-ahead for that country's na-
tional parliament to move toward national recognition of same-sex
marriages, and the parliament is considering a bill that, if passed, will
make Canada the third nation, after the Netherlands and Belgium, to
recognize same-sex marriage throughout the country.' 6 This means
that if a federal amendment did pass, it would create legal havoc as
courts would have to decide the status of property purchased previ-
ously in tenancy by the entireties," 17 the legitimacy of children born to
or adopted by a previously married parent, 18 any wrongful death or
other derivative action that may be pending prior to the amendment's
statistics change in light of President Bush's support for a marriage amendment announced dur-
ing The 2004 State of the Union Address. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
114. Pam Belluck, Governor of Massachusetts Seeks to Delay Same-Sex Marriages, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 16, 2004, at A12.
115. A California County Superior Court judge sitting in San Francisco found that the state's
ban on same-sex marriage violates the Equal Protection Clause of the California Constitution.
The tentative decision noted that the ban was a form of gender discrimination warranting sus-
pect classification. Furthermore, because marriage is a fundamental right, strict scrutiny applies
and the state must meet its burden of showing a compelling reason for the ban. Lisa Leff, Judge
Says California Can't Ban Gay Marriage, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 14, 2005, at 2 (citing Tentative
Decision on Applications for Writ of Mandate and Motions for Summary Judgment, Judicial
Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4365 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005)), available at http://
www.sftc.org/Docs/marriage.pdf. See, e.g., Dean E. Murphy, San Francisco Forced to Halt Gay
Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12. 2004, at Al. In New York, the Mayor of New Platz faces
charges for performing unlicensed marriages between gay couples. Christine Hauser, Top Hats
and Two Grooms on a Cake, but No Licenses. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21. 2004. § 1. at 29. See also
Matthew Preusch, Oregonians Look to One Suit to Settle Gay Marriage Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
25, 2004, at A16.
116. Clifford Krauss, Canadian Court Clears Path for Same-Sex Marriage Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 2004, at A18. See also Colin Campbell, World Briefing Americas: Canada: Same-Sex Bill
Hits Parliament, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2. 2005, at A9.
117. Tenancy by the entireties is a form of joint property ownership available exclusively to
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enactment,' 19 and the legal status of spouses of foreign dignitaries
who accompanied them to the United States. All this is aside from
any economic boost to the hospitality industry by the influx of a new
market for wedding celebrations and honeymoon getaways.
20
President Bush's attempt to write discrimination into the highest
law of the land with a constitutional amendment banning gay mar-
riage is profound precisely because it flies in the face of higher equal
protection principles that the Constitution demands, at least since the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 2 1 If President Bush's
amendment were to pass, we should be prepared to make a higher-
ordered moral argument that it would not be an unconstitutional usur-
pation of power-treating that phrase to encompass a system of politi-
cal morality that justifies the Constitution-for a courageous Supreme
Court to annul such an amendment's effect, analogous to the way the
Constitution itself would annul an amendment taking away a state's
representation in the U.S. Senate without its consent. 122 As Professor
Samuel Freeman has noted, the Supreme Court may be justified in
nullifying any amendment that would undermine freedom of speech
or religion.' 23 In a similar vein, the proposed marriage amendment is
as abhorrent to those principles underlining the post-New Deal egali-
tarian state as well as recent developments in international human
rights law, as it would be for the Vatican to release an infallible state-
ment by the Pope that there is no God supporting the underlying the-
ology of his office. 124 My concern here is not only conceptual but also
practical about the relationship of normative and ex post facto law to
a constitutionally just order. At least, in light of recent work by
Professors Ronald Dworkin,12 5 Alan Gewirth,'126 and myself, 27 such
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ideas as constitutional nullification are certainly worthy of serious in-
tellectual exploration as the culture war on this topic intensifies.
VI. CONCLUSION
What grounds the current debate over same-sex marriage versus
unions then is a concern for true human equality in a matter most
deeply affecting the private lives of many Americans. While it is not
reasonable to believe that we can eliminate, in a single struggle, deep-
seated negative beliefs about same-sex relationships, we should not
write invidious discrimination into law. We must be motivated, as
were those in the past when confronting a similar issue, to say that
separate but equal is neither equal nor constitutional, and we will not
tolerate it to be otherwise. What better gift to give ourselves on the
year following the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education
than a renewed commitment to resurge that case's deeper meaning in
this cutting-edge area of civil rights law.
127. See generally VINCENTr J. SAMAR. JUSTIFYING JUDGMENT: PRACJ ICING LAW AND PHILOS-
OPHY (1998).
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